Monday 17 May 2010

The best of 'frenemies'

'Frenemies” is a horrible word. It sounds like a children’s action cartoon adventure circa 1985. Working recently in the US with a leading global publishing organisation, I noticed it was by far and away the word of the week. It describes those market players with whom we can both work and compete. Friend and foe; opponent and compatriot; Tory and Liberal. But once you decide to focus on the ‘friend’ part of the word, what does that mean to an organisation behaviourally? How do leaders in particular have to amend their way of working – and thinking? Seeing not opponents, but partners.

Let’s look at behaviour we see regularly at CHPD. Senior leaders in all walks of life can quickly become very single minded in the pursuit of organisational goals. Driven variously by shareholder demands, market sensitivity and personal ambition – a case of tunnel vision develops. They work towards the next shareholder report, the next election, the next winning tape. At CHPD we call this the ‘tyranny of the tunnel’. Three of our behaviours are chronically affected by this condition, while the rest can be impacted periodically. The chronic behaviours are concept formation; conceptual flexibility and influence.

Concept formation is essentially about creating ideas. The ‘tyranny of the tunnel’ can mean that a leader sticks rigidly to pre-existing concepts that are not anchored in relevant data. If new ideas are suggested they will reject them instinctively, citing how they could not work in practice. The analogy that springs to mind is the precocious chef, who rejects the concept of a new or altered menu.

The first cousin to this behaviour is conceptual flexibility. Having rejected even the notion of creating new ideas, this leader adopts a permanent strategy rejecting alternatives despite them being relevant and valued by others. It’s like a football manager sticking week in, week out, to the same tactical approach, regardless of opposition, because it has worked in the past. They refuse to alter their game plan regardless of the new available information on the opposing team. Only momentarily concerned with the loss of yet another match, they turn up at training on Monday with their ‘one last push’ speech.

Finally, influence. Given the closed approach detailed above, influencing by attacking others’ interests is inevitable. Leaders in this frame of mind are always trying to force other people down their preferred route through coercion and threats. Celebrity chefs and football managers again?

It’s very easy for any leader to enter the ‘tyranny of the tunnel’. The line between supreme self confidence and dogmatism is very thin, and what we see originally as purposeful leadership can mutate into belligerence. The contrast between former British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher’s, early and late years in office are the most clear, recent examples of this behavioural cross over. Her political life ended because she rejected the formation of new ideas, refused to countenance alternative policy perspectives in any meaningful way and used stridency of argument in place of sophisticated negotiation.

In short, Thatcher’s approach to ‘frenemies’ was clear cut. You were either with her or against her, there was no cross over. In working with anyone she would often ask: “Is he one of us?”

Following the 2010 British General Election, many of us who follow current affairs have been astounded by the audacity of the Tory/Lib-Dem coalition. Many people thought, including this author, that the arrangement would be a much looser ‘supply and demand’ agreement, not actually one where Cameron and Clegg share Government. However, what both party leaders have shown is how ‘frenemies’ could be a viable political, and business, strategy.

So what did the party leaders do? Firstly, the willingness to think differently about what was possible. Cameron saw that the result of the election, far from being a mousetrap for the party who assumed office, was an opportunity to reshape the political landscape. Behaviourally, his concept formation (creating ideas) was of a very high level. Given the disposition of the parties he saw that it was possible to reframe post war political assumptions – away from a centre left coalition to a centre right one. How many of us said as the results came in: “Yes, but the Lib Dems will never do a deal with the Tories”? To which Cameron said: “Says who?”

This daring, which showed an immense level of self confidence and political courage, brings us to another of the CHPD leadership behaviours: conceptual flexibility. The creation of the coalition exemplifies this behaviour at a very high level. As CHPD’s definition explains, the leader:

“Compares the merits of two or more realistic alternatives, by stating the pros and cons of each. [Creates] an over-arching plan or strategy as a result of this analysis, which maximises the benefits and minimises the downsides of the original options”.

We do not have space to recount individual policy conflation here, save to say that the output appears to be, as foreign secretary, William Hague, has said, “the best of the Liberal Democrat manifesto and the bulk of the Tory one.”

Once the strategy was set, the most difficult task was to begin for Cameron and Clegg: to persuade three key constituencies. They comprised of a) each other b) their own parties c) the public. The use of influence at a high level was now paramount. Convincing each other was the easiest part: when offered power most politicians will take it by gut instinct. How they influence their own parties was, and remains, the most formidable challenge. But, concentrating on the ‘friends’ part of ‘frenemies’ has worked wonders. Three examples: the abolition of the third runway at Heathrow appeals to the Lib Dems environmental instincts, as well as Tory parsimony; the rejection of ID cards meets Lib Dem civil rights concerns and again Tory parsimony; and the use of PR to elect the House of Lords appeals to Lib Dem electoral instincts and to Tory …well they have lots of other policies that will rebalance this. But how do they persuade the public? The simple answer is: they don’t have to … yet. The combined majority of the Con/Lib Dem coalition should keep them in power for a full five year term (this is almost assured by changing the ‘no confidence’ rules). Naturally, Clegg and Cameron will hope that their success in office will be the best influence on the electorate.

If a week is a long time in politics, half a decade is a lifetime. Asked what was his biggest challenge as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan famously replied: ”Events, dear boy, events”. How this new kind of Government deals with these events will reveal if these best of friends can really avoid the ‘tyranny of the tunnel’.

Russell Deathridge

CHPD leadership consultant

1 comment:

Sean Murphy said...

Thanks Russell here's some related thoughts on Sucession Planning.

Regards

Sean Murphy

In the Tent or Out

Barack Obama's appointmet of Hillary (and Bill) as Secretary Of State has prompted much fury amongst some of his supporters who had hoped for a clean break and genuine change, as promised, by Barack on the stump.
It prompted thoughts and questions about whether former rivals for the top job in a country or a company can ever work successfully together.
Mrs Thatcher dealt decisively and contemptuously for a time with her rivals, in dismissing them as ' wets '. It came back to haunt her with Michael Heseltine’s resignation and the leadership election which followed, they queued up to tell her that she lacked support of her colleagues and hence could not continue.
Three examples from succession at great companies do prompt some lessons. The succession at GSK has passed from JP Garnier to Andrew Witty. His two rivals in spite of being offered (as reported) inducements of millions and seats on the GSK board did not stay and found themselves eventually, lucrative situations in rival companies or outside.
Similarly the newly appointed chief executive of Nestlé saw one of his rivals emerge as the chief executive of Unilever (the first chief executive from the outside for 78 years).
Probably the most well documented and widely praised Chief Executive succession of recent times was that of the legendary Jack Welch at GE. Welch claims to have contemplated and planned for his successor for 10 years. The three main rivals each had deputies appointed so that's when the eventual successor was chosen that there would be in turn succession to those posts. Jeff Immelt eventually emerged as the anointed one whereupon his two rivals promptly left.
Whilst this does deliver substantial corporate head room and in some senses frees up the remainder of the organisation for others. It is surely wasteful of talent at the very top or the company.
The question therefore is given that these individuals are ' in it to win it ' whether they can ever stick around and work successfully with the victor in a succession plan which is inevitably a bruising encounter for the ego as well as the ambition.
Which makes Hillary's decision to accept and Barack's decision to invite her, all the more surprising. There are probably two factors at work here:
First at the top of the American political system there is simply no other place to go once the top job has been secured. There is no equivalent of a fortune 500 company waiting in the wings to snap up more talent.
Secondly and this is unique perhaps to Hillary's situation and to Barack’s dilemma. Hillary comes with Bill. This provides access to a successful and admired former President full of potential to add a dimension of experience, thinking and imagination in delivering Barack's vision.
Is there a way therefore of harnessing the vanquished rivals in the business situation. The two for the price of one situation described above in Hillary’s appointment very rarely arises in business. The opportunity to deliver a rivals overall vision from within a company is necessarily limited given the ambition, independence and desire for autonomy which has driven all the rivals to the very near the top.
The conclusion therefore must be that the classic succession planning principle of having successors in the wings not just for the top jobs but for those immediately below the top must apply. GE’s approach would seem pragmatic whilst GSK’s in retrospect although no doubt well-intentioned, well engineered and well thought through, founders on the ambition and sheer ‘testicular fortitude’ (as Barack memorably described one of Hillary’s qualities) of the candidates nearing the top all large organisations